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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
that the extension of equity's jurisdiction into the criminal field violates
fundamental distinctions between criminal and civil courts intrinsic to our
system of jurisprudence.67
The concomitant advantages and disadvantages inherent in the granting
of injunctive relief should be analyzed by the reader in the light of the
following statement made in reference to, and contemporary with, the
Debs case:
It is indeed true that by the weight of authority the jurisdiction [of a court
of equity] is not ousted merely because, as in the case of a public nuisance, the
threatened act may be the subject of an indictment. But the foundation of the
jurisdiction over public nuisances, as of all jurisdiction in equity, is the greater
efficacy of the equitable remedy .... Jurisdiction in equity is for the adjudica-
tion of civil rights. Preliminary injunctions are to preserve the subject of litiga-
tion in status quo and prevent irreparable injury during the pendency of the
suit. The mere fact that the act enjoined is criminal may not oust the jurisdic-
tion of the Court, since every crime involves also an infraction of civil rights.
But to justify the interference of a court of equity by preliminary or by per-
petual injunction, it must be shown that the injunction will prevent some
threatened injury for which the law affords no adequate relief. An injunction
against destroying property by violence or similar offense against the criminal
law accomplishes no such result. . . . Courts of equity cannot with propriety
or safety extend their jurisdiction, under the guise of protecting property, by
issuing decrees imposing merely cumulative prohibitions against that which the
criminal law already forbids, in order summarily to try and punish offenders
for acts in violation of these prohibitions.
If the course thus followed can be supported, the principles of equity juris-
prudence have received an important extension which may render "govern-
ment by injunction" more than a mere epithet. 08
67 Ralston, Government by Injunction, 5 Corn. L. Q. 424 (1920).
68 Dunbar, Government by Injunction, 13 L.Q. Rev. 347, 356, et seq. (1897).
PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL IN ILLINOIS
The legal fiction that corporations are entities, separate and distinct
from their stockholders, has enjoyed judicial sanction since the inception
of corporate recognition.1 As is the case with many legal principles, a
policy of too-strict adherence to the corporate-entity theory by the courts
would result in injustice.
To be specific: cases arise wherein an individual incorporates with the
avowed purpose of avoiding contractual or statutory obligations. In his
corporate capacity he proceeds upon a course of conduct which, if taken
by an individual, would result in civil liability for damages, or criminal
prosecution.2 This individual is obviously acting unlawfully, or in a man-
1 Superior Coal Co. v. Department of Finance, 377 I11. 282, 36 N.E. 2d 354 (1942).
2 E.g., Relago Rosin Products Co. v. National Casein Co., 321 I11. App. 159, 52 N.E.
2d 322 (1944), wherein it was held that evidence showing shipment of goods from
plaintiff to defendant, in the name of a dummy corporation, constituted a prima facie
case against defendant for the price of the goods shipped.
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ner which is contrary to public policy; but he cannot be judicially
"reached" unless the court divests him of his corporate "shell," and treats
him as an individual, subject to the law applicable to individuals.
Thus, in an appropriate case, and in furtherance of the ends of justice, a
corporation and the individual or individuals owning all its stock and assets
will be treated as identical, the corporate entity being disregarded where used
as a cloak or cover for fraud or illegality.3
This judicial process has come to be known as "piercing the corporate-
veil," or alternatively, "disregarding corporate existence," or "looking to
substance rather than form."
The objective here is to present the status of the law as enunciated in
Illinois decisions, in regard to the above-stated legal principle. Illinois cases
on point will be examined in an effort to illustrate what the courts did in
relation to different sets of facts, and the theory underlying their action
will be analyzed. However, before determining when the courts will
pierce the corporate veil, it will be well to ascertain the situations in which
they have refused to so do.
Obviously, corporate existence will not be disregarded when to do so
would constitute a fraud. As was stated in Central Trust Co. v. Calumet
Co.,4 two corporations having virtually the same stockholders will not be
considered as one entity for the purpose of enabling one of them to "avoid
payment of an honest debt." 5 There was cause to apply this principle
again when, in a 1942 case, 6 the parent corporation, a railway company,
and its wholly-owned subsidiary, a coal company which furnished the
entire output of its mines to the parent corporation, had utilized separate
corporate forms for forty years, during which time the subsidiary had
gained financial and economic advantage as a result. It was here held that
the subsidiary could not demand that its separate corporate existence be
disregarded so as to relieve itself from taxes under the Retailers Occupa-
tion Tax Act on sales of coal to the parent corporation.
When there is an attempt to determine incidental matters between out-
side parties not connected with or helpful in the determination of the ju-
dicial question in issue, the corporate veil will not be pierced. This was
substantiated where a petition in bankruptcy court sought adjudication of
a controversy between the alleged beneficial bondholders of bonds of the
debtor-subsidiary, and the corporation by which the subsidiary was
owned, with no hope of benefit to the debtor's estate. The court applied
the above-stated principle in refusing to disregard the corporate entities.7
313 Am. Jur., Corporations S 7 (1938).
4260 I11. App. 410 (1931). 5 Ibid., at 418.
6 Superior Coal Co. v. Department of Finance, 377 111. 282, 36 N.E. 2d 354 (1942).
7 In re Lubliner & Trintz Theatres, 100 F. 2d 646 (C.A. 7th, 1938).
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In addition to the type of case where to ignore corporate existence would
be tantamount to fraud, or where an adjudication in the nature of a de-
claratory judgment is asked, there have been several isolated instances
wherein Illinois courts, upon being requested to pierce a corporate veil,
have refused to do so. One such instance occurred in 1917, where it was
held that merely because two corporations had the same president and the
same secretary, and that one of the corporations, a construction company,
agreed to pay for work done by delivering stock of another corporation,
did not prove that the two corporations are the same, nor that one is dum-
my for the other, and that what one does, the other really does also.8
In a proceeding to reorganize a utility which had acquired property
from a corporation, the people who owned virtually all of the corpora-
tion's stock claimed a vendor's lien on the property. Said stockholders
asked that their corporate identity be disregarded and the transaction
viewed as a sale of property by stockholders. The court, in disallowing
the request, said that there were no circumstances which would justify a
disregard for corporate existence. 9
McDermott v. ABC Oil Burner Sales Corporationo presented an un-
usual problem. An oil burner manufacturing corporation and the defend-
ant sales corporation were owned and operated by the same people.
Plaintiff attempted to hold the two corporations jointly liable for property
damaged in his home when a burner was installed by the sales corporation.
The court, in refusing to recognize the two companies as one, said that "a
corporation is an entity separate and distinct from its stockholders and
from other corporations with which it may be connected."'"
Where a corporation changed its name, and a few days later a charter
was issued to a newly organized corporation in the previous name of the
corporation that changed its name, there were thereafter two separate en-
tities, and the holder of an agreement by the original corporation promis-
ing to pay a certain sum of money could not maintain an action against
the newly-formed corporation to recover on the agreement. 12
In a 1949 case, an individual proprietor of a business executed a chattel
mortgage to a judgment creditor without informing said creditor, or the
public, that he had organized a corporation wholly-owned by him, and at
about the same time transferred business property to the corporation by
mere book entries, without notifying the mortgagee or complying with
the Bulk Sales Act. It was held that such transfer would not bind the
mortgagee, and the separate entity of the corporation must be recognized,
8 Seymour v. Woodstock & Sycamore Traction Co., 281 Ill. 84, 117 N.E. 729 (1917).
9 In re Commonwealth Light & Power Co., 86 F. 2d 474 (C.A. 7th, 1937).
10266 Ill. App. 115 (1932). 11 Ibid., at 120.
12 Ernest Freeman & Co. v. Robert G. Regan Co., 332 Ill. App. 637, 76 N.E. 2d 514
(1947).
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so that the mortgage was not a voidable transfer in the corporation's
bankruptcy.' 3
Turning from a discussion of the cases wherein the corporate veil was
not pierced, the type of situation prompting the Illinois courts to take
opposite action will now be considered. These situations fall within four
basic classifications, wherein Illinois courts have consistently looked to
substance rather than form, and disregarded corporate existence.
THE OBLIGATION-AVOIDANCE CASES
Cases in which corporate veils are pierced with more regularity than
any other type are what may be termed the obligation-avoidance cases,
viz., those in which the incorporator has incorporated for the sole purpose
of avoiding a just obligation.
In a relatively early decision, a fraudulent conveyance of property by
the debtor-partnership to a corporation prior to the general assignment
for the benefit of creditors was held ineffectual and inoperative as against
a judgment creditor attempting to impeach it.14 In a case where the de-
fendant treated a corporation, wholly-owned by him and his family, as a
sole proprietorship, and held it out to creditors as such, defendant could
not defend on the basis of corporation when sued on a note signed by him
in the course of business.15 It was held that where the owner of all capital
stock of a corporation dealt with realty as his own in agreeing to have the
corporation convey the realty to a third party, equity would look at sub-
stance and not form, and would not permit the third party to avoid any
clear equity arising from the agreement between him and the stockholder
merely because legal titles came from the corporation and not from the
stockholder personally.' 6 Similar cases arising in 193417 and 194918 are in
support of the above decisions; and most recently, in a 1952 case involving
an attempt to garnish a bank account which allegedly had been transferred
by the primary debtor to another corporation, the two corporations were
held to be one and the same, thus preventing the primary debtor from dis-
claiming the bank account as his own.' 9
13 In re Le Maire Cosmetic Co., 174 F. 2d 749 (C.A. 7th, 1949).
14 Hinkley v. Reed, 182 Ill. 440, 55 N.E. 337 (1898).
15 Aurora Daily News Co. v. Frazier, 157 IMl. App. 456 (1910).
16 Kelly v. Lehmann, 297 Ill. 33, 130 N.E. 375 (1921).
17 Illinois Interior Finish Co. v. Poenie, 277 IMI. App. 554 (1934).
18 Dishinger v. Bon Air Catering, 336 Ill. App. 557, 565, 84 N.E. 2d 562, 566 (1949),
wherein the court declared: ". . . l[lnasmuch as it appears that the cause of the defend-
ant corporation is presented so as to protect and advance the interest of William R.
Johnson, who is the motivating force behind the defense, he will be deemed a party
in the broad connotation of the term, and will be bound by the orders entered in these
proceedings."
'9 Kuttner & Kuttner v. Career Studios, 345 111. App. 504, 104 N.E. 2d 122 (1952).
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
THE PATENT INFRINGEMENT CASES
Four recent decisions have shown a propensity on the part of Illinois
courts to disregard corporate existence where infringement of patents or
copyrights is involved. In the first of these cases, the defendant corpora-
tion was using a subsidiary corporation to infringe upon the plaintiff's
patent.20 It was declared that the fiction of corporate entity may be disre-
garded where one corporation is the mere "instrumentality or adjunct" of
another corporation. This rule was followed in a 1953 decision,21 and
given additional support by two cases decided in 1956. In one, a corpora-
tion was formed for the purpose of publishing a songbook which in-
fringed upon plaintiff's copyright. Here, the defendant, who controlled
the corporation, was held personally liable.2 2 In the other case, the de-
fendant, after terminating its distributorship for the patent owner, con-
tinued to operate for the sole purpose of infringing and practicing unfair
competition. The wrongdoer was not allowed the protection of the cor-
porate veil, but was rather held "one and the same" as the corporation,
and thus, personally liable. 23
THE VIOLATION OF STATUTE OR INJUNCTION CASES
Apparently, where a corporation is formed in order to evade a statute
or a court order, that corporation's existence will be disregarded by an
Illinois court called upon to do so. In 1242 Lake Shore Drive Bldg. Corp v.
Hughes, a group of persons formed a syndicate for the purpose of obtain-
ing land and erecting an apartment building on the co-operative plan.24
They organized a corporation which issued all of its stock to the syndicate
and took title to the land as well as to the building subsequently erected.
The corporation was not allowed to contend that its annual franchise tax
on stated capital and paid-in surplus under the Business Corporation Act
should be fixed only on the value of the land without the building, be-
cause, under the co-operative plan, it issued a long-term lease with a nom-
20 Detroit Motor Appliance Co. v. General Motors Corp., 5 F. Supp. 27 (E.D. Ill.,
1933).
21 S.O.S. v. Bolta Co., 117 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Ill., 1953). The court here held that the
fiction of separate capacities is ". . . not applicable where stock ownership has been re-
sorted to, not for the purpose of participating in the affairs of a corporation in the
normal and usual manner, but for the purpose as in this case of controlling a subsidiary
company so that it may be used as a mere agency or instrumentality of the owning
company ....
22 Whitol v. Wells, 231 F. 2d 550 (C.A. 7th, 1956).
23 Powder Power Tool Co. v. Powder Actuated Tool Co., 230 F. 2d 409 (C.A. 7th,
1956).
24 369 Ill. 476, 479, 17 N.E. 2d 38, 39 (1938). Here it was stated by the court that
"where the corporate form has been used to circumvent a statute the corporate entity
will be disregarded in the interest of justice .. " And ".. . courts will view schemes of
this nature with care in order to prevent evasion of .. .duties imposed by the state."
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inal rental to the syndicate, which assigned portions of the lease to ulti-
mate purchasers of stock. The corporation was held to have received in
exchange for its stock the completed building as well as the land, and the
tax should be based on the value of both. In this case it was stated that
courts, in order to prevent corporate evasion of statutory or constitution-
al duties, will view with care corporate setups whereby the corporation
appears to avoid such obligation.
In 1945, a case arose wherein one corporation marketed petroleum
products and another operated a fleet of tank cars, both corporations be-
ing owned in the same proportion and by the same stockholders and hav-
ing, with minor differences, the same officers and directors.2 5 The two
corporations were considered as one, and their respective stockholders
were treated as the same for the purpose of applying a statute prohibiting
all rebates, concessions, or discriminations in respect to transportation of
property in interstate commerce by common carrier.
Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures26 was a case involving violation of an
injunction. The defendant corporation had been enjoined from running
a motion picture for more than two weeks in a given territory. A theater
owned by a wholly-owned subsidiary of the defendant violated the terms
of the injunction, and the violation was imputed to the defendant, i.e., the
court refused to recognize the separation of entity between the defendant
and the wholly-owned subsidiary.
THE LEASE ASSIGNMENT CASES
Although the final area is a limited one, it is one in which the Illinois
courts have indicated a willingness to pierce the corporate veil. It is the
area wherein a lessor places a provision in a lease against assignment or
subleasing without the lessor's consent. Later, the lessee incorporates.
Query: does the incorporation constitute an unauthorized assignment of
the lease by the unincorporated lessee to the lessee-corporation? Two re-
cent Illinois cases, one in 194827 and one in 1949,28 wherein lessors urged
this theory to dispossess their lessees, have answered in the negative.
Rather, the court will look to substance instead of form and hold that the
individual lessees are the same as the corporate lessees.2
9
25 Ohio Tank Car Co. v. Keith Railway Equipment Co., 148 F. 2d 4 (C.A. 7th, 1945).
26 170 F. 2d 783 (C.A. 7th, 1948).
27 Earp v. Schmitz, 334 111. App. 382, 388, 79 N.E. 2d 637, 639 (1948), where it was
decided that: "Plaintiffs have not been misled in any way by the formation of the cor-
poration. They dealt with Schmitz individually. There was no change in the business
after the corporation was formed." On this theory, the court held the corporation and
the stockholder to be one and the same.
28 Liberty National Bank of Chicago v. Pollack, 337 Ill. App. 385, 85 N.E. 2d 855
(1949).
29Ibid.
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CONCLUSION
In deciding whether or not a corporate veil should be pierced, it would
be well for the courts to pay heed to Ballantine's caveat:
The problems involved, however, are to be solved not by "disregarding" the
corporate personality, but by a study of the just and reasonable limitations
upon the exercise of the privilege of separate corporate capacity under particu-
lar circumstances in view of its proper use and functions. If the separate cor-
porate capacity is perverted to dishonest uses, as to evade obligations or statu-
tory restrictions, the courts will interpose to avoid the abuse.8 0
Mechanical application of a formula in determining whether or not the
corporate veil should be pierced is inherently dangerous. For there is no
general formula to fit all cases, such as "alter-ego" or instrumentality.
Each situation must be considered by the court on its merits.
As Mr. Justice Cardozo observed in a case involving substantially the
same considerations:
The problem is still enveloped in the mists of metaphor. Metaphors in law
are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they
end often by enslaving it. We say at times that the corporate entity will be
ignored when the parent corporation operates a business through a subsidiary
which is characterized as an "alias" or a "dummy." All this is well enough if
the picturesqueness of the epithets does not lead us to forget that the essential
term to be defined is the act of operation. . . . The logical consistency of a
juridicial conception will indeed be sacrificed at times, when the sacrifice is
essential to the end that some accepted public-policy may be defended or up-
held. This is so, for illustration, though agency in any proper sense is lacking,
where the attempted separation between parent and subsidiary will work a
fraud upon the law. . . . At such times unity is ascribed to parts which, at
least for many purposes, retain an independent life, for the reason that only
thus can we overcome a perversion of the privilege to do business in a cor-
porate form.8 '
It may thus be concluded that the use of the entity privilege of separate
capacities in Illinois is at all time subject to limitations of an equitable na-
ture to prevent the privilege from being exercised or asserted for illegal,
fraudulent, or unfair purposes by those claiming under it; and the courts
of law or equity will step in to prevent its abuse as the situation, and jus-
tice, may require.
80 Ballantine, Corporations § 122 (2d Ed., 1946).
31 Berkey v. Third Avenue Railway Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926).
THE PROPOSED JUDICIAL ARTICLE: AN
ESCAPE FROM ANACHRONISM
Much has been written about the proposed judicial amendment to the
Illinois Constitution in regard to the election of judges, but only a paucity
of writing has been devoted to the ever-increasing need to change the
